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This paper envisages whether an external habit effect can produce indeterminate 
equilibrium paths thereby generating endogenous investment fluctuations.  In an otherwise 
standard optimal growth model with leisure, we find that an external habit effect can cause 
endogenous investment fluctuations if there is a proper habit effect together with a proper 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  In a calibrated version of the model, we find that 
endogenous investment fluctuations are plausible when the habit effect is negative with the 
“catching up with the Joneses” effect. 
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1.  Introduction 
  Recent years have seen voluminous research in economics and finance that considered 
the habit effect.
1  In finance, for example, Constantinidis (1990), Abel (1990, 1999) and 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) resolved the equity premium puzzle in the context of the 
representative-agent, consumption-based model with a habit added to the standard power 
utility function.  In economics, the habit effect has been widely adopted in business cycle 
models to help account for aggregate fluctuations (Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000; Boldrin et al., 
2001).  The habit effect also assists in improving responses to monetary-policy actions 
(Fuhrer, 2000; Mansoorian and Michelis, 2005) and explaining the process of economic 
growth (Carroll et al., 1997; Alvarez-Cuadrado et al., 2004; Doi and Mino, 2008).  Most of 
these existing papers considered an external habit effect.  By allowing for adjacent 
complementarity in consumption, an external habit effect affects the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution and thus helps to resolve the equity premium puzzle and to account for aggregate 
fluctuations and economic growth.  Each of these papers found a determinate equilibrium 
path toward a steady state.   
  This paper studies an otherwise standard optimal growth model and investigates whether 
an external habit effect can create indeterminate equilibrium paths.
2  In otherwise standard 
optimal growth models, indeterminate equilibrium paths and thereafter equilibrium 
indeterminacy were first found by Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994).  
Indeterminate equilibrium paths in these two papers required increasing social returns in 
                                                      
1 The concept of the habit effect may be traced to Hume (1748) who argued that preferences were 
influenced not simply by what a person did in the past, what his parents did, and what contemporary 
peers were doing but also by the behavior of past generations of peers.  Similar contemporary ideas 
dated to Marshall (1898), Duesenberry (1949), Leibenstein (1950), and Hicks (1965).  Subsequent 
research has identified two kinds of habit formation.  One is referred to as external habit formation, 
expressed in terms of the past consumption of some outside reference group, usually the past 
consumption of the overall economy, and is the focus in the current study.    The other is termed internal 
habit formation based upon an individual’s own past consumption level. 
     
2 Evidence of the habit effect has been prevalent and was confirmed as early as the 1950s by Brown 
(1952) who estimated the habit effect by using the aggregate data in Canada.  Recently, a growing 
body of empirical evidence concerning external habit persistence has emerged.    Using time-series data 
in the U.S., Fuhrer (2000) strongly supported the hypothesis of consumption habit formation.  More 
recently, using panel data in the U.S., Ravina (2005) and Korniotis (2010) both have provided strong 
evidence about external habit persistence in household consumption choices.  Using data from other 
countries, supportive evidence of external habits has been offered by, among others, van de Stadt et al. 
(1985) who used longitudinal panel surveys of households in the Netherlands, Case (1991) who used an 
Indonesian socio-economic survey, and Carrasco et al. (2005) who used household panel data from 





production that were higher than empirical estimates derived later by Basu and Fernald (1997) 
and others.  This brought about research using more general specifications of production to 
revealing indeterminate equilibrium paths with much lower increasing social returns.
3  T h i s  
approach also led to investigations employing more general specifications of preference 
further highlighting indeterminate equilibrium paths based on external current consumption 
flows.
4    However, with the exception of Auray et al. (2002, 2005), papers with more general 
specifications of preference did not analyze the relationship between the habit effect and 
indeterminate equilibrium paths. 
Auray et al. (2002, 2005) found indeterminate equilibrium paths in dynamic models with 
labor as the only input and with a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint and a habit effect.  
Although there was the interplay of the habit effect and the CIA constraint in these two models, 
indeterminate equilibrium paths resulted mainly from the CIA constraint with a given 
exogenous growth rate of money supply, a property that has been known since Woodford’s 
(1994) contribution.
5    Indeed, even when the habit effect was internal as specified in Auray et 
al. (2005), indeterminate equilibrium paths spawned.  An external habit effect alone did not 
generate indeterminate equilibrium paths in these two papers.  In particular, Auray et al. 
(2002, 2005) did not consider capital.  Thus, while the models by Auray et al. (2002, 2005) 
can successfully explain large endogenous fluctuations of labor hours in business cycles, they 
cannot explain large endogenous fluctuations of investment which is an important feature in 
the course of business cycles.    By contrast, we analyze an otherwise standard optimal growth 
model save for the habit effect.  Thus, indeterminate equilibrium paths in our model are 
resulted from the habit effect on its own.  Moreover, our equilibrium manifests endogenous 
fluctuations in investment.     
Specifically, we study a standard optimal growth model with leisure whose equilibrium 
path toward steady state is known to be determinate (e.g., Blanchard and Fischer, 1989).    We 
add in an external habit effect.
6  We expect that when there is a proper external habit effect 
                                                      
3  See Wen (1998) in a one-sector model and Benhabib and Farmer (1996) and Benhabib and Nishimura 
(1998) in two-sector models. 
 
4  See Drugeon (1998), Chen and Hsu (2007) and Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008). 
 
5 Woodford (1994) found that in a monetary economy with a CIA constraint, equilibrium is 
indeterminate under a given exogenous growth rate of money supply but is unique under a pegged 
nominal interest rate. 
 





together with a proper intertemporal elasticity of substitution (henceforth, IES), equilibrium 
paths are indeterminate featuring endogenous investment fluctuations.    We posit that a proper 
external habit effect generates social complementarity in consumption that is ignored by the 
representative, rational agent.  This creates a self-reinforcing mechanism linking private and 
collective choices so expectations-driven equilibrium paths may potentially arise.  Through 
affecting the labor and leisure tradeoff, an external habit effect indirectly affects the social IES.   
Therefore, a proper IES is required in order to ease the tradeoff between consumption and 
investment/savings.  
In the theoretical model, we find that a positive habit effect and a negative habit effect 
both can generate endogenous investment fluctuations.  In a calibrated version of the model, 
we find that endogenous investment fluctuations are empirically plausible only when the habit 
effect is negative with the “catching up with the Joneses” effect. 
  As developed below, Section 2 sets up the model and analyzes the steady state.    Section 
3 investigates the conditions of endogenous investment fluctuations and offers quantitative 
analysis.    Finally, concluding remarks are made in Section 4. 
 
2.  The  Model 
Time is continuous.  The basic model is an otherwise standard optimal growth model 
with leisure wherein we consider the habit effect.  The economy is populated by 
representative households with infinite lives and the population of households is fixed with a 
unit measure.  The representative agent is endowed with one unit of time.  At each point in 
time t the agent allocates to the market a fraction lt as labor services and the remainder 1-lt as 
leisure.    An agent obtains utility from his or her own consumption (ct) and leisurely activities.   
Moreover, an agent’s utility is affected by the consumption habit in the society, Ht.  The 
lifetime utility is 
 
0
(, , 1 ),
t
tt t eu c H l d t
      (1) 
where u is the level of instantaneous utility and ρ>0 is the instantaneous discount rate.     
  We assume that the instantaneous utility is twice continuously differentiable with the 
                                                                                                                                                         
consumptive habits as demonstrated in our paper.    This concept of consumptive habit is different from 
that of a “deep habit” studied in models with many consumption goods in which private agents form 
habits not only from their overall consumption levels but also from the consumption of different goods 





following properties:  (i) ui>0>uii, i=1, 3, (ii) u11+u12<0 and (iii) u11u33-(u13)
2≥0.  In (i), the 
utility displays the standard positive and decreasing marginal utility of consumption and 
leisure.  The assumption (ii) guarantees a positive IES, while the assumption (iii) ensures a 
jointly concave utility in own consumption and leisure.  We also assume that consumption 
and leisure are both normal goods.    While we do not impose the sign of u2 as the habit effect 
may be positive or negative, it is worth noting that if u12>0, then past habit in the society 
enhances an agent’s marginal utility of consumption and there is thus the “catching up with the 
Joneses” effect (Abel, 1990). 
The consumption habit is a stock in the society at time t.  Following Ryder and Heal 
(1973, p.2), habit is accumulated from the distant past to the present and is a weighted average 
of past consumption flows in the economy, with weights declining exponentially in the distant 
past.  Specifically,  habit  is 
,0 , 
   





d e He C  
where Ct is average consumption in the society in t.
7    The above expression may be rewritten 
as follows. 
  0 ( ), 0 , with   given. tt HC H H                        ( 2 )  
  This law of motion says that the society’s future habit is increased by the difference 
between current average consumption and existing habit adjusted by a non-negative, finite 
coefficient, β.  The coefficient of habit formation characterizes the strength of the influence 
that current average consumption affects future habits.  It is clear that the larger the value of 
β, the larger the influence of current average consumption in the formation of future habits.  
Two extreme cases are as follows.  If β=0, then Ht is fixed and is given by H0 for all t.  In 
this case, our model is reduced to the standard one-sector optimal growth model with leisure.  
Conversely, if β=∞, then the habit adjusts so fast such that the habit in the society is 
completely determined by current average consumption; namely, Ht=Ct.  In this case, our 
model is reduced to a one-sector growth model with current consumption externalities (cf. Liu 
and Turnovsky, 2005).     
  The economy has a continuum of firms with a unit measure.    A firm is endowed with a 
                                                      
7 The formulation is different from that in Auray et al. (2002, 2005) which assumed Ht=Ct-1 and thus 
their habit is determined by the society’s consumption last period.  The Ryder and Heal’s formulation 
is more general.    Constantanidis (1990) used the same habit formation regime as ours except his habit 
is internal. 





neoclassical production technology f(kt, lt) where kt is per capita capital stock and the marginal 
product of each input is positive and is decreasing in input.  Firms are competitive and are 
thus price takers.    Since the Cobb-Douglas technology is used in the indeterminacy literature 
following Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994), we use it here given by   
1 (,) , 0 1 . tt tt fkl A kl
 
    
The optimization problem in a decentralized economy is as follows.  First, given wage 
rates, wt, and rental rates of capital, rt, a representative firm at each point in time t chooses 
optimal demands for capital and labor in order to maximize its profits.  Denote δ as the 
depreciation rate of capital.    The optimal conditions are as follows. 
          (1 ) , tt t wA k l
  
       ( 3 a )  
         
11 . tt t rA k l
  
    (3b) 
Next, taking wage rates and rental rates as given by the market and the habit as given by 
the society, the representative household’s problem is to tradeoff between consumption and 
savings and tradeoff between working and leisure in order to maximize her lifetime utility (1), 
subject to the following budget constraint 
           . tt t t t t kw lr kc     (4) 
  The optimal conditions are 
          1(, , 1 ) ,    tt t t ucH l  (5a) 
                3(, , 1 ) ,    tt t t t ucH l w  (5b) 
          ( ) , tt t r      (5c) 





   which is the transversality condition.  The variable λt is the 
co-state variable associated with capital and thus, the shadow price of capital.  In these 
optimal conditions, (5a) and (5b) equates the marginal utility to the marginal cost for 
consumption and leisure, respectively, and (5c) is the Euler equation for capital.   
 For  given  k0 and H0, competitive equilibrium is a path {k, l, H, w, r, λ} with c=C, and is 
determined by (2), (3a)-(3b), (4) and (5a)-(5b).     
  To determine the competitive equilibrium, first, we simplify equilibrium conditions by 

















which equates the marginal product of labor to the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure. 




   
tt t t t kA k l kC                            ( 7 )  
  Therefore, equilibrium conditions are simplified to (2), (5b), (6) and (7).  In a steady 
state, 0   kH      and thus (2) indicates H
*=C




* in the same way as does in an otherwise standard growth model with leisure.   
 
3.  Endogenous  Investment  Fluctuations 
    In this section, we study endogenous investment fluctuations by investigating the 
dynamic property of the model.   
 
3.1  The Conditions of Endogenous Investment Fluctuations 
  In this subsection, we will show that, under a finite, sufficiently large coefficient of habit 
formation, if there is a proper habit effect together with a proper IES, then equilibrium paths 
toward a steady state are indeterminate and thus there are endogenous investment fluctuations. 
  We simplify the dynamic system into three variables.  First, by the implicit function 
theorem, (6) leads to the following relationship 
(,, ) .  tt tt ll C k H                              ( 8 )  
  Differentiating (5a) with respect to time, with the use of (3b), (5c) and (8), yields the 
Keynes-Ramsey condition as follows. 
       1 {( )( ) [( ) ] },                 t
tt
C
tk t t kH Cf k H  (9) 
where ) , (0          
       33 3 (,, ) / 0 ,   tt t ul ckH u  
       11 1 /0 ,    t uc u  
       13 1 (,, ) / ,   tt t ulckH u  
       13 3 /,   t uc u 
       12 1 /,   t uH u 





Note that if the preference exhibits the “catching up with the Joneses” effect, then it is 
more likely >0.  Under the concavity condition, /σ+<0 and thus, +<0, which 
indicates <0.  It is required that the IES of consumption is positive: (-α-)/Ω>0.  This 
implies (-α-)<0.  Moreover, the assumption of consumption and leisure both being normal 
goods gives   
     ( ) ( ) 0 .           ( 1 0 )  
The dynamic equilibrium system consists of (2), (7) and (9) and determines the dynamic 
path of ct, kt and Ht.    If we take Taylor’s linear expansion of the dynamic equilibrium system 
in the neighborhood of the steady state, along with the use of (8), we obtain a Jacobean matrix, 
denoted as J.    The characteristic polynomial of the Jacobean matrix is 
  
32 () () () () 0 ,         GT r J D s J D e t J                ( 1 1 )  
where Det(J) is the determinant, Tr(J) is the trace, Ds(J) is the sum of the determinant of the 
second-order principal minors, of the Jacobean matrix J, given, respectively, by 
       
(1 )( )[ (1 )] () ( ) [ ( ) ] Det J
   
     
 
       (12a) 
        1 () ,   Tr J T            (12b) 
            2 () ,    Ds J M         ( 1 2 c )  
where 
1
1 () [( )( ) ( )],                
      
1
21 () { ( 1 ) () ( ) [( 1 ) ] } ,                
      





    
8 
      
1
() { ( ) [ (1 )]( ) } 0. ()                     T
9       
 
    As the economic system includes two state variables with initial values determined at k0 
and  H0, a steady state is a sink and the equilibrium path toward the steady state is 
indeterminate if the number of eigenvalues with negative real parts is three.  Examining the 
polynomial function G(ω), it is clear that G(ω)=-∞ when ω=∞ and G(ω)=∞ when ω=-∞.  In 
view of the Routh-Hurwitz stability criterion, the necessary conditions for the presence of 
three stable roots are: (i) G(0)=Det(J)<0, (ii) G′(0)=-Ds(J)<0, (iii) Tr(J)<0 and (iv) – 
                                                      
8  M is the determinant in the standard growth model (in the case of β=0) and thus M<0.  
  
9  M<0 and (10) together indicate (+)>0 and ()<0.    Moreover, the concavity condition implies 
(+)<0.  It follows that T>0.  





Ds(J)+Det(J)/Tr(J) < 0 .     
    We  can  obtain  the  following  result. 
 
Theorem 1.  Suppose that the coefficient of habit formation 0<β<∞ is sufficiently large.  
Then under χ> + -+, Γ1<0 and Γ2>0, the steady state is a sink.   
Proof:  See  Appendix.  
 
     It is worth noting that the restriction of β>0 makes our model different from the standard 
optimal growth model which emerges under the case of β=0.  On the other hand, the 
restriction of β<∞ makes our model different from a one-sector growth with current 
consumption externality studied by Liu and Turnovsky (2005) and Alonso-Carrera et al. 
(2008).
10  Finally, the restriction of a large β demands a large weight of current average 
consumption in the formation of future habits.   
        Examining the conditions in Theorem 1, the condition Γ1<0 requires (-α-)/Ω>0 which 
calls for a proper IES.  Moreover, as the external habit effect appears in χ and ς, the 
conditions χ>+-+ and Γ2>0 require the external habit effect to be in a proper range.     
    Theorem 1 thus stipulates that under a sufficiently large coefficient of habit formation, 
the steady state is a sink and there are endogenous investment fluctuations if there is a proper 
habit effect together with a proper IES.    A proper degree of the external habit effect assures a 
social complementarity in consumption which generates self-reinforcing mechanism 
connecting individual and joint choices so expectations-driven equilibrium paths may 
potentially arise.  A proper IES makes easier the tradeoff between consumption and 
investment/savings so consumption can be increased or decreased more easily and thus, 
investment/savings can be decreased or increased more easily. 
   The intuition for generating endogenous investment fluctuations goes as follows.  In 
order to exhibit endogenous investment fluctuations, an expectations-driven equilibrium 
requires higher investment to raise the marginal product of capital and thus the return to 
capital.  Starting with an equilibrium path, a proper external habit effect can produce a 
self-reinforcing mechanism linking private and collective choices.    If the representative agent 
expects that all other agents in the society will increase investment/savings and reduce 
                                                      
10 Both Liu and Turnovsky (2005) and Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008) studied an otherwise standard 
growth model except for including current consumption externalities.  Liu and Turnovsky (2005) 
focused on the efficiency of the competitive equilibrium in the long run, while Alonso-Carrera et al. 





consumption, the agent will also expect that all other agents will decrease leisure, as 
consumption and leisure are complements.  When there is a proper IES, consumption and 
leisure both can be reduced sufficiently and the labor supply in the society is increased 
sufficiently.    Through the Pareto complementarity, a large labor supply enhances the marginal 
product of capital sufficiently large that the direct negative effect of investment on the 
marginal product of capital is dominated by the indirect positive effect through a larger labor 
supply.   Knowing these, the agent will decrease consumption and increase investment which 
earns a higher return.  The expectations are thus self-fulfilling.  Therefore, in equilibrium, 
depending on the expectations, all economic agents may choose to increase investment today 
or to reduce investment today.  There are thus endogenous fluctuations in aggregate 
investment dictated by expectations. 
  The intuition shown above can be confirmed more clearly in a discrete-time setting. The 
discrete-time version of our model is to maximize the discounted sum of future utilities 
subject to a periodic budget constraint and the following habit accumulation equation
11  
1 () , 0 .       tt t t HC H H  
  Here, we assume u12>0 (“catching up with the Joneses” effect) and u13>0 (Edgeworth 
complementarity between consumption and leisure).     




















   tt t rA k l   is the rate of return to capital in period t+1. 
        Now suppose that at the beginning of period t the economy stays in the steady state.    We 
assume that a sunspot shock makes the households anticipate a rise in the rate of return to 
capital in period t+1. From the Euler equation an anticipated rise in rt+1 substitutes the current 
consumption Ct with the next period's consumption Ct+1, and thus Ct decreases and Ct+1 will 
increase.  If  β=0 so that the habit stock stays constant over time (Ht=Ht+1=H), then due to the 
complementarity between consumption and leisure, lt rises and lt+1 falls.    As a result of a rise 
in capital stock due to a higher saving in period t and a reduction in labor supply in t+1, the 
rate of return to capital rt+1 will decline and, hence, the initial expectations are not 
                                                      
11  The discounted sum of utility is  1
1 0() ( ,, 1) , 0  

    
t
tt t t uc H l   and the budget constraint is 
1
1 (1 ) .
 







    W h e n   β>0, the habit accumulation equation and the Euler equation yield 
11 1
11
(, ( 1 ) , 1) 1









uC C H l
uCH l r  
Note that a decrease in Ct lowers Ht+1 through the habit accumulation  equation.  Other  things 
being equal, a fall in Ht+1 reduces the marginal utility in t+1 because of our assumption u12>0. 
This effect would be large if the adjustment speed β is sufficiently high.  Such an external 
effect in period t+1 may not decrease but increase lt+1.    Therefore, a sufficiently large impact 
of the change in habit stock would produce a larger labor supply in period t+1, which may 
offset the decrease in the marginal product of capital in period t+1 caused by a higher 
investment in period t.  If this is the case, the initial expectations are self fulfilled and 
sunspot-driven  investment  fluctuations  emerge.     
 
3.2 Quantitative Analysis 
In this subsection, we employ a parametric model and envisage whether endogenous 
investment fluctuations are quantitatively plausible.         
The utility is assumed to take the following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
form,  
1
1 11 (, , 1 )[ ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) ].
   
     tt t t t t uc H l cH l              ( 1 3 )   
    In  the utility,  parameter  μ>0 is the share of leisure relative to consumption.  This utility 
function satisfies the joint concavity and is non-separable in c and 1-l.  The parameter ν≥0 
and 1/ν measures the elasticity of substitution (henceforth, ES) between consumption and 
leisure.  The utility is general and includes the following three special cases: (i) when ν=0, 
the ES between ct and lt is infinite and the utility is a linear form; (ii) when ν=1, the ES 
between  ct and lt is one and the utility is a Cobb-Douglas form; (iii) when ν=∞, the ES 
between ct and lt is zero and the utility is a Leontief form.  Moreover, as we will see below, 
1/v also measures the degree of the IES as the IES is increasing in the value of 1/ν.  
Parameter ψ determines the degree of an external habit effect.  Other things being equal, a 
larger stock of habit reduces an agent’s utility if ψ<0 while a larger stock of habit increases an 
agent’s utility if ψ>0.  In particular, when ψ(1-ν)>0, the habit exhibits the “catching up with 
the Joneses” effect, which implies either (i) ψ>0 and 1/ν>1 or (ii) ψ<0 and 1/ν<1.    





condition in (9) is 
11 (1 ) 1
/ [( ) ( ) ( () ] . )
   




        t
tt tt t t t vk H
C CA k l k H        ( 1 4 )  
        The steady state is determined by (5b), (6) and (7).    Using the CES utility in (13), these 
three equations together lead to   
 
(1 1 (1 )
1
)
** ( 1 )
(
1
11 ) (1 ) (1 ) [ ( ) ( ) ] . A A ll
    
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   (15) 
    Equation (15) determines the level of l
* in steady state.  When l
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A HC l  
    T o  d e t e r m i n e  l
*, in a figure with l on the horizontal axis, the right-hand side of (15), 
denoted by (ψ), is independent of l and is thus a horizontal locus.    The left-hand side of (15), 
denoted by Φ(l, ψ), have two types of shape depending on the value of ψ(1-v)-v.
12   
    In Figure 1, which is under ψ(1-v)<v, the locus Φ(l, ψ) is monotonically decreasing in l 
for l≤1 with the value of Φ(l, ψ) decreasing from infinite when l=0 to zero when l=1.  In  this 
case, there is a unique steady state, l
*.   
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
    In Figure 2, which is under ψ(1-v)>v, the locus Φ(l, ψ) is first increasing and then 
decreasing in l for l≤1, with the value of Φ(l, ψ) increasing from zero when l=0, reaching a top 
when l
m=1-/[(1-)]<1 and finally returning to zero when l=1.  In this case, there are two 
steady states with the employment at l1
* and l2
*.  
[Insert Figure 2 here]   
        In the parameter region wherein a sink may arise, a negative determinant of the Jacobean 
matrix is equivalent to (1-)>/(1-l), which implies ψ(1-v)>v and l<l
m.  Thus, the steady 
state l
* in Figure 1 is not a sink.  In Figure 2, although l2
* is not a sink, the steady state l1
* 
may be a sink and thus endogenous investment fluctuations may emerge.     
    It is worth noting that the condition ψ(1-v)>v>0 stipulates that endogenous investment 
fluctuations may arise only under either (i) ψ>0 and 1/ν>1, or (ii) ψ<0 and 1/ν<1.  This 
indicates that if the utility is a Cobb-Douglas form (which arises under ν=1), the habit effect 
cannot bring about endogenous investment fluctuations in an otherwise standard optimal 
growth  model.   
                                                      
12 The  slope  of  Φ(l, ψ) is dictated by 
1 1) 2 ( (, ) * 1 [ {1)] 1 } . () (
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[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here] 
    Characterizing the steady state l1
* in Figure 2, the habit effect affects the employment 
level and thus, l1
*=l
*(ψ).    First, under (i) ψ>0 and 1/ν>1, when ψ increases, the habit effect is 
larger and the value of (1-) increases.  Both loci (ψ) and Φ(l, ψ) then shift downwards 
with (ψ) shifting more than Φ(l, ψ) at the original employment level l1
*.  See 
1(ψ>o) and 
Φ1(l, ψ) in Figure 2,  As a result, the steady state moves to E0
1
 with a lower steady-state 
employment level l1
1< l1
*.   
    N e x t ,  u n d e r  ( ii) ψ<0 and 1/ν<1, when ψ decreases, the habit effect is increased and the 
value of (1-) is larger.  Both loci (ψ) and Φ(l, ψ) also shift downwards, but (ψ) shifts 
downward less than Φ(l, ψ) at the original employment level l1
*.  Thus, under ψ<0, if we 
assume that a decrease in ψ also shifts Φ(l, ψ) to Φ1(l, ψ), then (ψ) is shifted downward to 

2(ψ<0) that is less than 
1(ψ>o).  See 
2(ψ>o) and Φ1(l, ψ) in Figure 2,  As a result, the 
steady state moves to E0
2 with a higher steady-state employment level l1
2> l1
*. 
According to (14), the IES is given by 
**
**
() ( 1 ) () 11
/( 1 ) ( ) 1( ) 1( ) (1 )[1 ] 0,
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v ll                   ( 1 6 )  
which is increasing in 1/ν.  In the case when ψ>0, a higher habit effect reduces the IES 
indirectly through a lower l
*.  On the other hand, when ψ<0, a higher habit effect increases 
the IES indirectly through a higher l
*. 
    D e n o t e   
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    To characterize the conditions of endogenous investment fluctuations under the CES 
utility in (13), first, under a given value of β, it is required that 1<0.  This condition 
demands /ν>D/ if >0 and /ν<D/ if <0.   
    Next, the condition χ>+-+ is equivalent to ψ(1-)>/(1-l)>0.  This condition may 
be read as either ψ<ψ2≡/[(1-)(1-l)] if <0 and 1/ν<1, or ψ>ψ2 if >0 and 1/ν>1.   
    Finally,  the  condition  2>0 requires ψ<ψ1≡E/[(1-)(+)Q].   






Proposition 1.  Under the CES utility in (13) and a sufficiently large β, the conditions of 
endogenous investment fluctuations are 
(i)  -D/[(-)]<1/ν<1 and <min{1, 2} if <0, 
(ii)  1/ν>max{D/(), 1}and 2<<1 if >0.    
 
Proposition 1 stipulates that both a positive habit effect and a negative habit effect can 
lead to endogenous investment fluctuations.    When the habit effect is negative (<0), a value 
of 1/v smaller than one can give rise to endogenous investment fluctuations.    However, when 
the habit effect is positive (>0), a value of 1/v larger than one is required in order to bring 
about endogenous investment fluctuations.  The results come from the fact that a higher l
* 
increases the IES in (16).  Under a negative habit effect, a larger habit effect (a smaller ) 
increases the IES indirectly through a larger l
*.  Therefore, a smaller 1/ν suffices to create 
endogenous investment fluctuations.  Alternatively, under a positive habit effect, a larger 
habit effect (larger ) lowers the IES indirectly through a smaller l
*.  Thus, a larger 1/v is 
needed in order to generate endogenous investment fluctuations.   
In Proposition 1, while endogenous investment fluctuations may emerge under both a 
positive habit effect and a negative habit effect, as our calibration exercises below show, only 
a negative habit effect is empirically plausible.     
Now, we quantitatively assess the plausibility of endogenous investment fluctuations in 




*=0.8, which are consistent with data in the US, and 
calibrate (14c) to obtain =0.05.  Furthermore, we normalize A=1 and set =0.04, and then 
use (14) to calibrate and obtain =0.36.  We choose the coefficient of habit formation at 
β=0.35.
13  Although there is no empirical data about the values of , we can choose  in 
order both to satisfy a positive IES in (16) and to ensure the existence of the steady state in 
(15).  We set =0.4.  Since the dynamic property of the steady state depends on the 
interaction between  and , we choose a combination of  and  that gives rise to 
endogenous investment fluctuations.  We choose the pair {, }={-2.25, 2.5} such that the 
calibrated value of l
* equal to 0.25 (Prescott, 2006).
14    Under this set of benchmark parameter 
                                                      
13 While Constantinides (1990) employed β=0.6, Carroll et al. (1997) and Alvarez-Cuadrado et al 
(2004) used β=0.2.    Our value lies within these existing values used.     
   






values, the steady state is: k*=2.181, l*=0.250, y*=0.545 and H*=C*=0.436.   
We are ready to study the empirical plausibility of endogenous investment fluctuations.  
For a given coefficient of habit formation β and a given degree of an external habit effect ψ, 
we will find the range of 1/ under which endogenous investment fluctuations prevail.  For 
the benchmark parameter values, we find that endogenous investment fluctuations arise if 
1<v<3.301, or equivalently if 0.303<1/v<1.  See  Table  1.   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
We conduct some robustness checks.  First, if we increase the value of β, we find that 
the required range of 1/v is the same.    Next, if we increase the value of  and thus lower the 
degree of an external habit effect, the range the 1/v decreases; if we decrease the value of  
and thus increase the degree of an external habit effect, the range the 1/v  increases.  Finally,  if 
we increase the value of  so >0, we cannot find plausible values of v so the conditions of 
endogenous investment fluctuations are met.  In Figure 3, we draw the range of (ψ, 1/v) that 
yields endogenous investment fluctuations.    See the shaded area in Figure 3. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Thus, our quantitative exercises indicate that endogenous investment fluctuations are 
empirically plausible only when the habit effect is negative, <0.  Our results stipulate that 
endogenous investment fluctuations are empirically plausible only when the habit effect is 
negative that features the “catching up with the Joneses” effect, ψ(1-v)>0.    It is worth noting 
that a negative effect of a rise in the stock of external consumption habits means that an 
individual household feels jealous of the other households’ (past as well as current) 
consumption.    In addition, the “catching up with the Joneses” effect implies that conformism 
prevails in consumption activities.  Jealousy and conformism have been frequently assumed 
by empirical oriented studies on the models with consumption externalities, because the 
households’ Euler equations with these assumptions can be supported by the data more easily 
than the Euler equations with positive consumption externalities (i.e., admiration) and 
anti-conformism (i.e., the “falling-behind-the-Joneses” effect, u12<0).  Therefore, our 
numerical experiments suggest that the economy with rapid formation of external habits may 
produce indeterminacy of equilibrium under empirically plausible conditions.               
  
4.  Concluding  remarks 





external habit effect can generate endogenous investment fluctuations.  A standard optimal 
growth model with leisure yields a determinate investment path toward a steady state and thus 
fluctuations of investment are the result of exogenous shocks to technology, preferences and 
policies.    By adding an external habit effect into an otherwise standard optimal growth model, 
we find that our model can endogenously generate investment fluctuations without resorting to 
exogenous shocks.  The interplay of social complementarity in consumption and the 
intertemporal substitution between consumption and investment/savings is the key to generate 
endogenous investment fluctuations  in  our  model.     
We find that under a sufficiently large coefficient of habit formation, fluctuations in 
investment can emerge endogenously when there is a proper degree of an external habit effect 
together with a proper intertemporal elasticity of substitution.    A proper degree of an external 
habit effect assures a social complementarity in consumption that is ignored by the 
representative, rational agent.  This generates a self-reinforcing mechanism linking private 
and collective choices that may give rise to expectations-driven equilibrium.  Through 
affecting the labor and leisure tradeoff, an external habit effect changes the social 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  Thus, it is required a proper intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution in order to ease the tradeoff between consumption and investment/savings so 
consumption can be increased or decreased more easily and thus, investment can be decreased 
or increased more easily. 
While a positive habit effect and a negative habit effect both may generate endogenous 
investment fluctuations, using a calibrated version of the model we find that only a negative 
habit effect can lead to endogenous investment fluctuations.  The endogenous investment 
fluctuations are empirically plausible when the habit effect is negative that features the 
“catching up with the Joneses” effect. 
 
Appendix 
In the Appendix, we prove the Theorem 1.  If we take the linear Taylor’s expansion of 
the dynamic equilibrium system (2), (7) and (9) in the neighborhood of a steady state, along 
with the use of (8), we obtain 
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 Let  J denote the Jacobean matrix in (A1) and ω denote its corresponding eigenvalue.  
The characteristic polynomial is in (11), with Det(J), Tr(J) and Ds(J) defined in (12a)-(12c). 
It is clear from (11) that G(ω)=-∞ when ω=∞ and G(ω)=∞ when ω=-∞.  A  sink  requires 
three stable roots.  The necessary conditions for the presence of three stable roots are: (i) 
G(0)=Det(J)<0 and (ii) G′(0)=-Ds(J)<0.    Moreover, according to the Routh-Hurwitz theorem, 
the requirement of no eigenvalues with positive real parts in the above characteristic 
polynomial suggests no variation in signs in the following series:  {-1,  Tr(J), 
-Ds(J)+Det(J)/Tr(J), Det(J)}.  This indicates the additional requirement of (iii) Tr(J)<0 and 
(iv) –Ds(J)+Det(J)/Tr(J)<0. 
To investigate these conditions, 
(i)   G (0)=Det(J)<0 
Since Det(J)=β(1-α)(ρ+δ)[ρ+δ(1-α)][( ) ]       /(-) and <0, it is obvious 
that this requires χ> + -+. 
(ii)  Tr(J)<0. 
  A s   T>0, Tr(J)<0 requires both 
            Γ1<0 and β>βa≡T/(-Γ1) > 0 .                       ( A 2 a )  
(iii)  G′(0)= -Ds(J)<0  
As M<0, Ds(J)>0 requires both   
  Γ2>0 and β>βb≡M/(-Γ2) > 0 .                        ( A 2 b )  
(iv)   –Ds(J)+Det(J)/Tr(J)<0 
    U n d e r  Tr(J)<0 in (ii), condition (iv) is equivalent to –Ds(J)Tr(J)+Det(J)>0.  Using 
(12a)-(12c), this requires 
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When L(β)=0, the polynomial has two roots β1 and β2 , β1≥β2, as follows. 
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Under (i) Det(J)<0, (ii) Tr(J)<0 and (iii) Ds(J)>0, both β1 and β2 are positive, as verified 
by 
β1β2=MT/(Γ1Γ2)>0 and β1+β2={N+Γ1M+Γ2T}/(-Γ1Γ2)>0. 
The inequality sign in (A3a) is satisfied if any one of the following two cases holds: (a) 
β>β1≥β2 or (b) β<β2≤β1.  However, case (b) is impossible as case (b) implies β2<T/(-Γ1)≡βa, 
which is against the requirement of β>βa for Tr(J)<0 in (ii).   
Therefore, (A3a) and –Ds(J)Tr(J)+Det(J)>0 both can be met only if 
  1.                                     ( A 3 b )  
  It is straightforward to show that β1>βa and β1>βb.  Thus, (A2a), (A2b) and (A3b) 
indicate that the requirement of β>β1.  
 Therefore,  under  β>β1, the conditions of a sink are: χ>+-+, Γ1<0 and Γ2>0.     ■ 
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Table 1:    Numerical results of local indeterminacy 










Note: benchmark parameter: A=1, =0.36, =0.04, =0.05, =0.4, =0.36, =-2.25 and 
     v=2.5; benchmark steady state: k*=2.181, l*=0.250, y*=0.545 and H*=c*=0.436. 
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